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The #MeToo movement has confirmed what many already know 
from experience: the rates of abuse, harassment, and other forms of gen-
der-based violence are astronomically high.1 Nationwide, 81% of women 
and 43% of men report experiencing some form of sexual harassment or 
assault in their lifetime.2 At least one-third of women aged 18 to 24, Black 
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 1 See STOP STREET HARASSMENT ET AL., THE FACTS BEHIND THE #METOO MOVEMENT: A 
NATIONAL STUDY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ASSAULT 9-10 (2018), https://perma.cc/
S55Q-BUBP. 
 2 U.C. SAN DIEGO CTR. ON GENDER EQUITY AND HEALTH ET AL., MEASURING #METOO: 
A NATIONAL STUDY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ASSAULT 10 (2019), https://perma.cc/
47U5-LAUW. 
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women, and lesbian or bisexual women reported sexual harassment in the 
past six months, the highest prevalence across demographics.3 While the 
#MeToo movement did not create this culture of abuse, it has increased 
the number of people who want to tell their stories.4 
Tarana Burke founded the #MeToo movement in 2007, which then 
spread like wildfire on October 15, 2017, when Alyssa Milano tweeted, 
“If you’ve been sexually harassed or assaulted write ‘me too’ as a reply 
to this tweet.”5 “The next day, 609,000 posts carried that hashtag,” and 
over the course of a year the hashtag appeared in almost 14 million 
tweets.6 Prior to the first #MeToo tweet, there were other highly publi-
cized allegations of systemic abuse and harassment in the entertainment 
industry, but now the movement had a name, several faces, and was in-
creasingly difficult to ignore.7 As the movement continued to gain steam, 
businesses fired at least 201 men due to accusations of sexual harassment 
or assault, and state and local legislation protecting employees’ rights re-
garding abuse allegations emerged in 15 states.8 
Stories of abuse are rising across multiple contexts, from the criminal 
legal system, where the percentage of rapes or sexual assaults that were 
reported to police rose by 17% in 2017, to workplace settings, where the 
 
 3 Id. at 11. 
 4 See, e.g., Collin Binkley, #MeToo Inspires Wave of Old Misconduct Reports to Col-
leges, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/Y3R6-DAFB. For instance, in the 
first half of 2018, Michigan State University received 22 complaints from two decades ago or 
longer. In the previous five years combined, there were just nine cases that old. Id. 
 5 Stephanie Zacharek et al., The Silence Breakers, TIME (Dec. 18, 2017), https://
perma.cc/VB2P-D4V9. 
 6 Riley Griffin et al., #MeToo: One Year Later, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 5, 2018), https://
perma.cc/TN45-BEKW. 
 7 See, e.g., Gottwald v. Sebert, 172 A.D.3d 445 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019); Graham Bowley, 
Bill Cosby Assault Case: A Timeline from Accusation to Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 
2018), https://perma.cc/7X2M-KWKC. 
 8 Audrey Carlsen et al., #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their 
Replacements Are Women., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/7MSV-NJY8; #Me-
Too: Its Impact and What’s Happening Now, Am. Bar Ass’n (Sep. 2019), https://perma.cc/
PY6K-J2UM. Fifteen states have passed reforms to protect workers from sexual harassment 
since October 2017: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana, Mary-
land, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Washing-
ton. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., PROGRESS IN ADVANCING METOO WORKPLACE REFORMS IN 
#20STATESBY2020 5-14 (2019), https://perma.cc/9TMQ-244W. Additionally, Congress has 
introduced the BE HEARD in the Workplace Act, which strengthens and expands current 
antidiscrimination laws. Vania Leveille & Lenora M. Lapidus, The BE HEARD Act Will Over-
haul Workplace Harassment Laws, ACLU (Apr. 10, 2019, 11:15 AM), https://perma.cc/
A9FS-DCJQ. 
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number of sexual harassment complaints filed with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) increased by 13.6% in 2018.9 
Furthermore, the Time’s Up Legal Defense Fund, created in support of 
the #MeToo movement, has received more than 3,500 requests in the year 
and a half they have been operating for assistance in addressing workplace 
sexual harassment. Two-thirds of those requests have come from low-in-
come workers, who are often the target of retaliation and harassment.10 
However, survivors remain fearful and hesitant to report the abuse they 
have experienced, acutely aware that institutional accountability mecha-
nisms often fail and that they might never find the justice that they seek.11 
As a result of greater access to public forums and the criminal and 
civil legal systems’ inadequate treatment of sexual abuse or harassment 
cases, survivors are increasingly using other platforms to expose abuse 
they were subjected to.12 The criminal legal system is a daunting avenue 
to pursue, since reporting abuse often involves a rigorous process with a 
low rate of success.13 Moreover, it can take years for some survivors to 
process the trauma they have experienced, and statutes of limitations can 
prevent them from pursuing claims after the time limits for claims ex-
pire.14 In addition, some survivors do not anticipate achieving their goals 
through criminal and civil litigation; rather, they find solace in telling 
their story to the public. Others find support and relief in raising their 
voices or warning others about their experience with a particular person 
or institution, which makes it necessary to ensure that survivors are le-
gally protected when threatened by a defamation claim from the person 
or institution who harmed them.15 
 
 9 RACHEL E. MORGAN & JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL 
VICTIMIZATION, 2017, at 1 (2018), https://perma.cc/TSB5-SKJG; Press Release, U.S. Equal 
Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Releases Fiscal Year 2018 Enforcement and Litigation 
Data (Apr. 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/7YU9-PCPV. 
 10 Kara Fox & Antoine Crouin, Men Are Suing Women Who Accused Them of Harass-
ment. Will It Stop Others from Speaking Out?, CNN WORLD (June 5, 2019, 4:24 PM), 
https://perma.cc/RJB7-KXFB; Tina Tchen, Editorial, #MeToo Identified a Disease that Infects 
Business. We Still Have a Long Way To Go, CNN BUS. (Oct. 15, 2018, 8:29 AM), https://
perma.cc/UV7K-AW3N. 
 11 See Tchen, supra note 10. 
 12 E.g., Asia Fields, UW Students Publish Online ‘Rape List’ out of Hopelessness, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 26, 2018, 3:25 PM), https://perma.cc/CTE8-V4P8. 
 13 The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, RAINN, https://perma.cc/PD2C-4GTK (last 
visited May 3, 2020). 
 14 See LYNN LANGTON & JENNIFER TRUMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOCIO-EMOTIONAL 
IMPACT OF VIOLENT CRIME (2014), https://perma.cc/L5QV-7PKE. For a list of relevant stat-
utes of limitations by state, see State by State Guide on Statutes of Limitations, RAINN, 
https://perma.cc/B98J-KVTV (last visited May 3, 2020). 
 15 Moira Donegan, I Started the Media Men List: My Name is Moira Donegan. N.Y. 
MAG.: THE CUT (Jan. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/2HG7-SPB4; Fields, supra note 12; Kate 
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A troubling number of cases illustrate that when survivors share sto-
ries of their abuse, the accused may respond with defamation claims,16 
which are known as strategic lawsuits against public participation or 
SLAPPs.17 The Time’s Up fund has found that the number of defamation 
claims in response to survivors’ stories was higher than they expected, 
and they were “surprised to see how many people have come to them for 
help in defamation cases.”18 Colby Bruno of the Boston-based Victim 
Rights Law Center reported that, previously, about 5% of her caseload of 
alleged campus sexual assaults involved an accuser facing a defamation 
suit from the alleged perpetrator. Now, a little more than half do.19 In 
Washington, frustration at the lack of institutional response to abuse 
claims and fear of retribution—like SLAPPs—led anonymous University 
of Washington college students to compile lists of sexual assault allega-
tions that grew to nearly 400 submissions, with students from other 
schools asking how they could create their own lists.20 The students’ fears 
were validated when three men threatened to sue unless their names were 
removed from the list.21 The experience of the University of Washington 
students and other cases of sexual abuse raise questions about how survi-
vors can share their stories and protect themselves legally. 
The defamation claims and lawsuit threats that survivors have expe-
rienced indicate that future survivors may want to assess the likelihood 
that their abuser will litigate in response to an allegation of abuse or vio-
lence made in forums outside of criminal and civil litigation, as well as 
the very real risk of the abuser’s success based on the available defenses.22 
 
Thayer, Sexual Assault Survivors Are Publicly Accusing Attackers on Social Media. But at 
What Cost?, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 14, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/AT6D-NFFY. 
 16 See, e.g., Bensussen v. Tadros, No. BC682869, 2018 WL 2390162, at *1 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Mar. 8, 2018); Gottwald v. Sebert, 172 A.D.3d 445 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019); Verified Com-
plaint for Damages & Demand for Jury Trial at 2, Palmieri v. Osborn, No. BC681889 (C.D. 
Cal. Nov. 3, 2017); Bailey Loosemore, Haymarket Whiskey Bar: Woman Who Says Owner 
Drugged Her Files Countersuit, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Dec. 26, 2017, 7:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/2RDX-NCAF; Gene Maddaus, Brett Ratner Drops Libel Suit Against Rape 
Accuser, VARIETY (Oct. 2, 2018, 6:15 PM), https://perma.cc/7HHG-U9QK. 
 17 See George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 4 (1989); Brandi M. Snow, SLAPP Suits, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLO-
PEDIA, https://perma.cc/V7WS-K3K6 (last visited May 3, 2020). 
 18 Fox & Crouin, supra note 10. 
 19 Tyler Kingkade, As More College Students Say “Me Too,” Accused Men Are Suing for 
Defamation, BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 5, 2017, 11:26 AM), https://perma.cc/2KRW-MDEU. 
 20 See Fields, supra note 12. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Statements made in the context of judicial proceedings are outside the scope of this 
article because they are privileged material, precluding defamation litigation. RODNEY A. 
SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 8:5 (2d ed. 2019). This article focuses on claims made by 
survivors in non-privileged forums, specifically statements made to the public through social 
media or within survivors’ communities. 
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This Note considers the viability of several defenses that survivors can 
employ if they find themselves faced with a defamation claim after they 
have disclosed their experience of abuse. 
Part I begins with an overview of the defamation elements and de-
fenses, using examples to illustrate how these claims have been inter-
preted in cases brought against gender-based violence survivors. Part II 
explores some recent, highly publicized lawsuits that have the possibility 
of setting new precedent and providing a roadmap for litigators to use 
when assessing how to defend their clients in defamation cases. These 
highly publicized cases include ones where a survivor-plaintiff alleges 
that the abuser-defendant has defamed them by denying their claims of 
abuse and by arguing that the survivor is a dishonest, untruthful, or a gen-
erally difficult person.23 The survivor turns to a defamation claim to de-
fend their reputation or because there has been some negative impact on 
their livelihood.24 However, for many survivors with fewer financial re-
sources, these types of lawsuits are out of reach, and their struggles con-
tinue to remain largely in the dark with minimal legal protection.25 Con-
sequently, this paper evaluates the outcomes of some defamation cases 
brought against abusers solely to determine the impact they may have on 
cases where the survivor faces SLAPP-based defamation charges. 
Finally, this article concludes with suggestions on how to respond to 
defamation claims, with a particular focus on anti-Strategic Lawsuit 
Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP) lawsuits, as they serve as a 
practical defense when survivors allege that the defamation claims 
brought against them are solely a tool to silence their voices and prevent 
future survivors from speaking their truth. 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF DEFAMATION 
Defamation has been a common law cause of action since the late-
15th century.26 Grounded in state tort case law and bolstered by state con-
stitutional and statutory law, defamation has evolved haphazardly and 
 
 23 See generally McKee v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2017); Judd v. Weinstein, No. 
CV 18-5724 PSG (FFMx), 2019 WL 2881248 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2 , 2019); Clifford v. Trump, 
339 F. Supp. 3d 915 (C.D. Cal. 2018), appeal filed, No. 18-56351 (9th Cir. Oct. 16, 2018); 
Green v. Cosby, 138 F. Supp. 3d 114 (D. Mass. 2015); Dickinson v. Cosby, 250 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
350 (Ct. App. 2019); Zervos v. Trump, 171 A.D.3d 110 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019). 
 24 See cases cited supra note 23. 
 25 Tchen, supra note 10. Two-thirds of requests to Time’s Up Legal Defense Fund came 
from low-income workers, where nearly 40% are women of color and one in ten is a member 
of the LGBTQ community. Id. 
 26 Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. 
REV. 546, 552-53 (1903). During the period from 1475 to 1610, six percent of several hundred 
cases that were filed in English courts constituted defamation claims. It is worth noting that 
the vast majority of these defamation claims were related to sexual immorality. Id. 
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varies by U.S. jurisdiction.27 The elements of defamation have developed 
through the centuries, with the modern judiciary referring to state law or 
the Restatement of Torts in case analyses.28 The analysis set forth in this 
article primarily focuses on the elements of defamation in the context of 
cases involving sexual harassment or violence as defined in a variety of 
states across the nation. 
A. Elements of a Defamation Claim 
The elements of a defamation claim vary slightly but rely generally 
on the same four principles that are established in the Restatement Second 
of Torts.29 The Restatement defines the elements of defamation as “a false 
and defamatory statement concerning another; an unprivileged publica-
tion to a third party; fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of 
the publisher; and either actionability of the statement irrespective of spe-
cial harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.”30 A 
claim for defamation is an umbrella term that incorporates the “twin torts 
of libel and slander,” where spoken words are slander and written defam-
atory words are libel.31 
 
 27 See supra note 22 § 1:1. 
 28 See generally Malla Pollack, Litigating Defamation Claims, in 128 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, 
§ 2 (2013). For example, New York defamation law is grounded in common law: “To state a 
claim for defamation under New York law, the plaintiff must allege: (1) a false statement 
about the plaintiff; (2) published to a third party without authorization or privilege; (3) through 
fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) that either consti-
tutes defamation per se or caused special damages.” Id.; Thai v. Cayre Grp., Ltd., 726 F. Supp. 
2d 323, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). “To establish a prima facie case of defamation in Tennessee, 
the plaintiff must establish that: 1) a party published a statement; 2) with knowledge that the 
statement is false and defaming to the other; or 3) with reckless disregard for the truth of the 
statement or with negligence in failing to ascertain the truth of the statement.” Sullivan v. 
Baptist Mem’l Hosp., 995 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tenn. 1999). Under Ohio law to establish a libel 
claim, a plaintiff must show “1) a false statement, 2) defamatory to the plaintiff, 3) published 
to a third party, 4) by a defendant who was at least negligent, and 5) damaging to the plaintiff’s 
reputation.” Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Mich., Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 312 (6th Cir. 2000). In 
Montana, libel is “a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or 
other fixed representation that exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy or 
causes a person to be shunned or avoided or that has a tendency to injure a person in the 
person’s occupation.” MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-802 (West 2019). And in North Dakota, libel 
is “a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed 
representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, 
or which causes the person to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure the 
person in the person’s occupation.” N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02-03 (West 2020). 
 29 See, e.g., 128 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, § 2 n.3 (2013). 
 30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977). 
 31 See SMOLLA, supra note 22, §§ 1:10-11. 
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All states have implemented a statute of limitations to allot a 
timeframe for when a defamation claim may be pursued. Each state pre-
scribes its own statute of limitations, which is often one or two years (with 
some variations).32 However, a few jurisdictions apply the discovery rule, 
where the statute of limitations begins to run on a cause of action at the 
time the injured party discovers, or, through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, could have discovered facts supporting the cause of action 
within the applicable period.33 A prima facie defamation claim cannot 
survive unless the claim is within either the statute of limitations or the 
discovery rule, as required by the state where the action would take place. 
The first element of a defamation claim requires that the defendant 
make a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff.34 “Since 
falsity is a necessary element of a defamation cause of action and only 
facts are capable of being proven false, only statements alleging facts can 
properly be the subject of a defamation action.”35 In addition, the Supreme 
Court has focused on whether the allegedly defamatory statement implies 
an “assertion of fact” about a person that is “provably false,” thus estab-
lishing two factors that require consideration when determining whether 
the statement is defamatory: the language employed in the statement itself 
and the type of speech involved.36 
For instance, in a defamation case brought by an adult film star, 
Stephanie Clifford, against President Trump, President Trump was able 
to defeat her defamation claim based on the “type of speech” analysis.37 
Ms. Clifford alleged she had been in an intimate relationship with Presi-
dent Trump and filed her defamation claim after he tweeted that she was 
lying about being threatened by a man he hired and that her whole story 
was a “con job.”38 While the plaintiff established that the language in 
President Trump’s speech itself contained factual statements, the review-
ing court analyzed the text of the single tweet as well as its context and 
ultimately determined that the statement was a non-actionable opinion 
characterized as “rhetorical hyperbole,” which was further influenced by 
 
 32 See Practical Law Practice Note Overview 3-619-6023, Defamation Basics State Laws 
Chart: Overview (West 2020). 
 33 See generally Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Limitation of Actions: Time of Dis-
covery of Defamation as Determining Accrual of Action, 35 A.L.R.4th 1002 § 2 (1985). 
 34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977). 
 35 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 28 (2020). While a statement must be false to be 
defamatory, true statements can be defamatory where they create a false impression. The test 
for determining whether a statement is one of fact or opinion is discussed below in Section 
I.B. 
 36 See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990). 
 37 Clifford v. Trump, 339 F. Supp. 3d 915, 919, 926 (C.D. Cal. 2018), appeal filed, No. 
18-56351 (9th Cir. Oct. 16, 2018). 
 38 Id. at 926. 
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the plaintiff presenting herself as a political adversary.39 Therefore, while 
the president’s tweet did include verifiably true or false statements, the 
reviewing court’s characterization of it as “rhetorical hyperbole” meant it 
was not to be understood as a literal statement about the plaintiff and 
therefore protected from defamation liability.40 
Beyond whether or not a statement can be proven true or false, it is 
not always clear which party carries the ultimate burden of proving its 
falsity, as this overlaps with the defense of truthfulness of the statement 
at issue. Therefore, while the plaintiff must establish the prima facie case 
of falsity, the standard of proof and the party bearing the burden of proof 
may vary depending on the jurisdiction and circumstances surrounding 
the case.41 This is one of the greatest challenges survivors will face, be-
cause it requires the survivor to publicly present the details of their trau-
matic experience to prove their own truthfulness, when there is often min-
imal evidence of the violence other than the survivor’s own testimony. 
Thus, having a clear standard on who bears the burden of proving fact or 
fiction prior to making allegations is in the survivor’s best interest. 
The second element of proving defamation requires that the oral or 
written statement be defamatory. Courts frequently rely on the Restate-
ment’s definition of defamatory, which is harming “the reputation of an-
other so as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter 
third persons from associating or dealing with him.”42 “The courts ordi-
narily assume, without question or discussion, that language which is 
merely abusive is not, per se, a basis for an action of defamation,” but 
there is no general rule as to “what words are defamatory and what are 
not,” and “each case depends largely on its own facts.”43 While the Re-
statement suggests that derogatory statements are, minimally, ones that 
cause harm to an individual or group’s reputation as understood by a sub-
stantial and respectable minority of the community, some jurisdictions go 
as far as to proclaim that a derogatory statement is one that is “somewhat 
shocking” and “contains ‘elements of personal disgrace,’” thus requiring 
a higher bar to establish a prima facie case of defamation.44 
 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See 128 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, § 8 (2013). 
 42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 43 Annotation, Abusive Words as Slander or Libel, 37 A.L.R. 883 (1925). 
 44 Means v. ABCABCO, Inc., 315 S.W.3d 209, 214-15 (Tex. App. 2010) (quoting 
ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 2-12 (3d ed. 2009) (1999)); see Reed v. Scheffler, 
218 F. Supp. 3d 275, 283-84 (D.N.J. 2016) (holding that the mayor’s statements to a local 
newspaper that the homeowner was derelict in taking care of his mother’s home did not harm 
the homeowner’s reputation and estimation in the community because they did not rise to the 
level of contempt or ridicule, thus prohibiting the homeowner’s defamation claim); Jackson 
340 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:332 
Intent is the third element of a defamation claim, and the standard 
applied depends on the plaintiff’s status as either a private or public fig-
ure. New York Times Company v. Sullivan broadly established that public 
officials cannot recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to 
official conduct unless the publication of that falsehood was made with 
actual malice.45 Subsequently, the Supreme Court broadened the term 
“public official” to include public figures and private individuals whose 
purposeful activity “amounted to a thrusting of [their] personality into the 
‘vortex’ of an important public controversy.”46 Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc. further refined the standard by concluding that states may impose 
liability with a less demanding showing than in New York Times when the 
plaintiff is a private individual.47 
In a climate where individuals can become public figures overnight 
through social media pages and viral videos, defining a public figure be-
comes increasingly difficult. Gertz provides the prevailing all-purpose 
public figure test, which defines a public figure as an individual who has 
achieved “such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public fig-
ure for all purposes and in all contexts.”48 A second category of public 
figures is the limited-purpose or vortex type, where one who “voluntarily 
injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy”49 that ex-
isted prior to the alleged defamation or engages “the public’s attention in 
an attempt to influence [an] outcome” becomes a public figure for a lim-
ited range of issues.50 The issue of whether a particular public figure be-
longs to the first or the second category must be resolved as a matter of 
law and may require a fact-sensitive determination.51 
The public versus private figure analysis is based on the recognition 
that there is a need both to protect an individual’s reputation and to en-
courage an open and free press.52 If an individual is in the public eye, 
 
v. Mayweather, 10 Cal. App. 5th 1240, 1264-65 (Ct. App. 2017) (holding that an ex-boy-
friend’s assertion that he broke off a relationship with his girlfriend because she had an abor-
tion and his comments that she had cosmetic surgery on her face and other parts of her body 
were not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of defamation because the statements in 
question did not expose the girlfriend to “hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy”). 
 45 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-84 (1964). 
 46 Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). 
 47 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). 
 48 Id. at 351. 
 49 Grenier v. Taylor, 234 Cal. App. 4th 471, 484 (Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Reader’s Digest 
Ass’n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 244, 253 (1984)). 
 50 Gertz, 418 U.S at 352. 
 51 McKee v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54, 61 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Penobscot Indian Nation v. 
Key Bank, 112 F.3d 538, 561 (1st Cir. 1997)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A cmt. 
c (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 52 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341-42 (describing an individual’s “right to the protection of his 
own good name” as a concept of any decent system of ordered liberty and the protection of 
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there may be a greater need for information about their actions, and those 
who speak out should not have to live in fear of liability when they have 
publicized such information for good-faith purposes.53 In addition, public 
figures have greater access to large audiences through the media; there-
fore, they have a “greater opportunity to rebut defamatory statements” 
and will reach a wider range of people than a private party might.54 Courts 
have presumed that those who become media public figures do so volun-
tarily, thus “invit[ing] attention and comment,” and should be aware that 
they are vulnerable to derogatory claims that could be made against 
them.55 Consequently, the Supreme Court requires a public figure plain-
tiff in a defamation case to demonstrate a higher level of fault, known as 
actual malice, or reckless disregard by the defendant as to whether the 
statement was false or not. Alternatively, for private figure plaintiffs, in-
dividual jurisdictions may define their own standard of liability, like mere 
negligence.56 
“Actual malice” has two definitions in defamation cases, depending 
on the jurisdiction.57 The Restatement defines a person who acts with ac-
tual malice as one who “knows that the statement is false and that it de-
fames the other person, or acts in reckless disregard of these matters.”58 
In common law, actual malice is defined by evidence of ill will or hatred 
that, alone, is insufficient to show liability for defamation in most 
courts.59 Instead, “actual malice” focuses on the defendant’s attitude to-
ward the truth or falsity of the statement, and not the defendant’s attitude 
toward the plaintiff.60 For example, where a defendant shared his con-
cerns to other members in the church community about their pastor’s in-
appropriate behavior with women, the court found there was no actual 
malice because the defendant believed his source of information to be 
credible, and he did not seriously doubt the veracity of the allegations.61 
 
private personality as states’ prerogative under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 53 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45. 
 54 Jackson v. Mayweather, 10 Cal. App. 5th 1240, 1260 (Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Comedy 
III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 398 (2001)). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 328; Gen. Prods., Co. v. Meredith Corp., 526 F. Supp. 546, 551 (E.D. 
Va. 1981) (finding that because the plaintiff was not a public figure, the standard of liability 
for defamation is defined by the Commonwealth of Virginia and thus could be premised on 
mere negligence); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 57 See BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 35:82 (2d 
ed. 2018). 
 58 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 59 See LINDAHL, supra note 57. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Campone v. Kline, No. 03-16-00854, 2018 WL 3652231, at *11-12 (Tex. App. Aug. 
2, 2018). 
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Reckless disregard as to falsity is likely not an issue for survivors 
who allege abuse, as they are making claims about events they experi-
enced firsthand. While common law standards for reckless disregard vary 
within the context of a public figure’s defamation claim, the Supreme 
Court has found, and the Restatement confirms, that reckless disregard is 
only satisfied when the defendant made the false statement with a high 
degree of awareness of probable falsity.62 When a survivor alleges sexual 
assault, their claims are typically about the abuse inflicted upon them by 
the perpetrator. Thus, the perpetrator’s allegation that the survivor is fab-
ricating their claims entirely precludes the reckless disregard of truth anal-
ysis. 
However, a survivor-defendant’s defense is complicated when the 
perpetrator alleges that the survivor acted with malice because they alleg-
edly fabricated the claim of abuse with a motive of hatred or ill will, par-
ticularly when the survivor feels understandable animosity toward the 
perpetrator based on the abuse they endured.63 In a jurisdiction that con-
siders hatred or ill will as part of their assessment for malice, evidence of 
the survivor-defendant’s sadness due to the plaintiff’s actions or love for 
the plaintiff may negate the malice accusation. Furthermore, a claim of 
malice may be considered questionable when the survivor-defendant al-
leged abuse after a relationship that appeared loving, which may not al-
ways be a viable solution when that previously loving or affectionate re-
lationship appears to have turned into one of animosity. On the other 
hand, if there was harassment or a sexual assault with little-to-no relation-
ship between the parties, public figure plaintiffs will likely have a more 
difficult time putting forth evidence of common law malice that would 
lead someone to fabricate such a damaging allegation.64 
Survivors’ speech may have more protections when the plaintiff is a 
public figure since the bar for intent that the plaintiff has to meet is rather 
high, which is only reasonable given that public figures often have access 
to more financial and legal resources than survivors do. This may have 
been a factor in some recent settlement agreements: celebrity plaintiffs 
like movie director Brett Ratner, rapper Nelly, and soccer player Cristiano 
Ronaldo, all of whom sued survivors for libel, have all agreed to settle 
with the survivor-defendants.65 One potential explanation for the plain-
tiffs’ choice to settle is their awareness that they must establish that the 
 
 62 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 64, 74 (1964)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 63 See, e.g., Jackson v. Mayweather, 10 Cal. App. 5th 1240, 1261 (Ct. App. 2017). 
 64 See Amanda Ottaway, Judge Hears Libel Case over ‘Shitty Media Men’ List, 
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Mar. 1, 2019), https://perma.cc/XAG8-UCSW. 
 65 Lewis Kamb, Rapper Nelly Settles Sexual-Assault Lawsuit with Seattle-Area Woman, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018, 11:38 AM), https://perma.cc/4ZVU-JQE8; Maddaus, supra 
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survivor-defendant acted with “actual malice” or with knowledge that the 
statement “was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or 
not.”66 However, actual malice may be inferred from the defendant’s 
statements or actions if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant 
fabricated the allegation or that their allegations were a product of their 
imagination.67 This continues to be the intent standard for abuse allega-
tions in defamation cases brought by public figures. If a fact-finder deter-
mines that the accuser published an allegation of sexual assault or at-
tempted rape that never happened, the conclusion will be “that the 
defendant knew that the events were false because she necessarily never 
experienced them.”68 Consequently, to satisfy the actual malice claim, 
public figure plaintiffs most likely need to establish that the survivor’s 
alleged instances of abuse never occurred or, if there is some truth to the 
survivor’s allegations, that the investigation could cause the plaintiff more 
harm than good if their abusive behaviors are exposed while trying to 
clear their name. Therefore, while survivor-defendants face an exorbitant 
amount of financial and legal resources in a legal claim brought against 
them by a public figure, the high threshold required to prove intent pro-
vides some explanation for why celebrity-plaintiffs often opt to settle ra-
ther than pursue the lawsuit. 
Lastly, to satisfy a defamation claim, the plaintiff-perpetrator must 
demonstrate either an actual injury or defamation per se. Defamation per 
se refers to defamatory language in which the meaning is apparent on the 
face of the communication, and there is thus no requirement to prove a 
special harm.69 Defamation per se is divided into slander per se and libel 
per se.70 Slander per se, unlike libel per se, is typically subdivided into 
categories.71 These categories often include allegations of crime, disease, 
allegations injurious to another in his or her trade, or imputations of chas-
tity on a woman.72 Slander per se can be particularly troublesome for sur-
vivors who allege abuse or harassment, which may fall into the category 
 
note 16; Ken Ritter, Lawyer: Ronaldo Rape Accuser Was ‘Emotionally Fragile’ at Time of 
Settlement, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 3, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://perma.cc/Z4HF-GEWD. 
 66 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). 
 67 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968); Ratner v. Kohler, No. CV 17-00542 
HG-KSC, 2018 WL 1055528, at *9 (D. Haw. Feb. 26, 2018). 
 68 Chastain v. Hodgdon, 202 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1222 (D. Kan. 2016). 
 69 SMOLLA, supra note 22, § 7:20 (“The term ‘per se’ refers to defamation whose defam-
atory meaning is apparent on the face of the communication or, in other words, defamation 
whose defamatory character can be established without the introduction of extrinsic evi-
dence.”); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES IN MEDIA CONTENT: INTERNET, 
BROADCAST, AND PRINT § 6:34 (2d ed. 2019) [hereinafter SMOLLA, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES]. 
 70 See 128 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, § 2 (2013). 
 71 See id. 
 72 SMOLLA, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES, supra note 69, § 6:34. 
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of criminal activity and thus constitute slander per se. If the abuser then 
sues the survivor for defamation and the survivor is found liable, there 
will be a damages award without any other proof of injury. In addition, 
depending on the profession of the abuser, injury in their office, profes-
sion, trade, or business could also lead to certain damages. When an al-
leged injury does not fall into one of the defamation per se categories, a 
jury must decide on a damages award by assessing whether the survivor-
defendant’s statements negatively impacted the abuser-plaintiff’s reputa-
tion within the relevant community. However, this assessment must be 
supported by admissible evidence and cannot be presumed in the absence 
of proof.73 “Actual injury” may include “personal humiliation, and mental 
anguish and suffering, provided they are proved to have been sus-
tained.”74 
Survivors making a claim of abuse or harassment will also want to 
be aware of the criminal defamation statutes in their state and any poten-
tial risk of criminal prosecution, because “criminal defamation prosecu-
tion and conviction remain constitutionally viable in many jurisdictions 
where sanctioned by state law.”75 Twenty-four states continue to have 
criminal defamation statutes on the books, despite the Supreme Court in-
stituting several limitations on permissible criminal defamation statutes 
and suggesting that criminal libel and slander laws have no place in mod-
ern society.76 The American Civil Liberties Union is currently challeng-
ing a New Hampshire criminal defamation statute for being impermissi-
bly vague and ripe for abuse by public officials who seek to punish their 
critics.77 Criminal defamation statutes can cause serious damage to the 
livelihoods of survivors. For instance, a Georgia woman was incarcerated 
as a result of her ex-husband’s claim that she defamed him when she 
posted on Facebook that he would not bring their children Tylenol.78 
 
 73 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 74 Id. cmt. b. 
 75 DAVID ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER’S GUIDE § 4:5 (2019). 
 76 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1964) (finding Louisiana’s criminal defa-
mation statute unconstitutional because it directs punishment for true statements made with 
actual malice, contrary to the New York Times rule prohibiting punishment of truthful criticism 
and because the statute punishes false statements without regard to if they were made with ill 
will); see Map of States with Criminal Laws Against Defamation, ACLU, https://perma.cc/
Q68S-JXDS (last visited Feb. 24, 2020). The following states currently have criminal defa-
mation statutes: Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin. Id. 
 77 See Conor Friedersdorf, The ACLU Takes Aim at Criminal-Defamation Laws, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/M55F-9TER. 
 78 Notably, Georgia’s criminal defamation statute was held unconstitutional in 1982, so 
the defendant sued her ex-husband and the police captain for malicious prosecution and false 
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When alleging abuse or harassment, an important protective measure 
that survivors should take is to determine if there is a criminal statute in 
the applicable jurisdiction. Due to technological and social media ad-
vancements, defamation claims can now spread across many states and 
even the whole nation. Knowing where criminal or civil liability may be 
enforced based on the venue rules of each state is an important factor 
when determining the potential consequences of sharing a story of abuse. 
B. Defenses to Defamation 
The applicable defenses for defamation include truth and opinion. 
Familiarity with these defenses is one way to help survivors of gender-
based violence put forth their most effective defamation defense with the 
goal of dismissing the claim as quickly as possible. 
The defense of truth is often the most viable option for victims. How-
ever, the burden of proof in defamation cases can make this defense chal-
lenging, as the plaintiff-perpetrator needs only to put forth some evidence 
of a statement of fact by the defendant that can be proven false with the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case.79 If the defendant-survivor brings the truth 
defense after the plaintiff provides their evidence that the defaming state-
ment was untrue, the defendant can then admit their own evidence that 
the allegation was true. In the highly publicized defamation case brought 
by Kathrine Mae McKee, an alleged sexual assault survivor, against well-
known Hollywood actor Bill Cosby, over statements contained in Cosby’s 
attorney’s letter to a newspaper, the First Circuit determined that because 
the letter Cosby’s attorney wrote was “heavily footnoted with citations to 
articles and other sources,” it “‘detail[ed] extensive underlying facts as 
support for the author’s assertions as to McKee’s lack of credibility.”80 
As a result, the court dismissed McKee’s defamation claims because the 
citations and sources established that the statements made by Cosby and 
his attorney provided the underlying facts to prove the truth and thus were 
not false.81 Consequently, in some jurisdictions, one way to prevent a def-
amation claim when making allegations against an abuser may be by ini-
 
arrest under 42 U.S.C § 1983. King v. King, 342 F. Supp. 3d 1364, 1382 (M.D. Ga. 2018) 
(dismissing all claims against plaintiff’s defendant-husband because he was not acting under 
color of state law and dismissing false-arrest claims because malicious prosecution is the “ex-
clusive remedy”), appeal dismissed, No. 18-14358 (11th Cir. Nov. 6, 2019); see Zola Ray, 
Georgia Deputy Sheriff Arrests Ex-Wife for Unflattering Facebook Post, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 9, 
2018, 5:34 PM), https://perma.cc/QYV6-E66T. 
 79 See supra note 41. 
 80 McKee v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54, 63 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting McKee v. Cosby, 236 F. 
Supp. 3d 427, 442 (D. Mass. 2017)). 
 81 Id. at 64-65. 
346 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:332 
tially disclosing the non-defamatory facts that underlie the original asser-
tions, although doing so may be uncomfortable or painful for some survi-
vors. 
A defense of truthfulness also allows survivors some flexibility, as 
“minor inaccuracies” will not prove a falsity claim as long as the sub-
stance, gist, or sting of the charge is generally accurate.82 Floyd May-
weather, a famous boxer, was sued by his ex-girlfriend for defamation 
because of his claim that he ended their relationship because she had an 
abortion, as well as his airing of information about her plastic surgeries.83 
However, the court ruled that these statements were not defamatory or 
false because she did have an abortion, even if it wasn’t the impetus for 
the ending of their relationship, and she did have plastic surgery, even if 
the statements about her surgeries were not entirely accurate.84 Therefore, 
the statements Mayweather made were truthful in substance, and the re-
viewing court reversed the order denying Mayweather’s special motion 
to strike Ms. Jackson’s defamation claims.85 
The fact-versus-opinion defamation defense relies on the premise 
that claims must be based on provable facts, not constitutionally protected 
pure opinions.86 The Restatement adheres to Gertz’s decision that expres-
sions of opinion which cannot be a basis for a defamation action regarding 
matters of public concern also logically cannot be a basis for defamation 
actions concerning private matters.87 Defamation cases brought under a 
state law generally adhere to this interpretation of Gertz and also recog-
nize the distinction between pure opinion statements and mixed state-
ments of opinion.88 Mixed statements of opinion imply “that the speaker 
knows certain facts, unknown to [the speaker’s] audience, which support 
[the speaker’s] opinion and are detrimental to the person [being dis-
cussed].”89 A mixed statement of opinion may include allegations by sur-
 
 82 Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991) (citing Heuer v. Kee, 
59 P.2d 1063, 1064 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936)). 
 83 Jackson v. Mayweather, 10 Cal. App. 5th 1240, 1261 (Ct. App. 2017). 
 84 Id. at 1261-62. 
 85 Id. at 1262-64. 
 86 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (“Under the First Amend-
ment there is no such thing as a false idea . . . .But there is no constitutional value in false 
statements of fact.”); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 
1977). 
 87 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339; See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. c (AM. LAW 
INST. 1977). 
 88 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 87. 
 89 Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 290 (1986). 
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vivors that an individual is a rapist or an abuser, since the survivor’s alle-
gation suggests there are facts that the public does not know about.90 This 
raises unique challenges for survivors who want to speak out. Character-
izing a person based on the abuse they subjected the victim to may be 
sufficient for defamation because they are conferring a fact about that in-
dividual, namely that the individual harmed them in some way.91 Recent 
high profile cases of sexual assault indicate that a survivor’s allegations 
of abuse are provable as true or false and are not matters of opinion.92 
As a policy matter, arguing that claims of assault and harassment are 
opinions is a slippery slope: doing so permits parties to claim that what 
constitutes an abusive behavior is open to interpretation, not a factual mat-
ter. For example, Matthew Landan, a bar owner in Kentucky, sued an un-
known woman for defamation after she posted a picture of him online 
with the caption, “MATTHEW LANDAN IS A RAPIST.”93 In response, 
the defendant moved for dismissal of the case, arguing truth as a defense, 
and countersued, claiming that the bar owner had filed a lawsuit with im-
proper intentions.94 The defendant likely chose the defense of truth over 
the fact-versus-opinion defense because doing so put the focus on whether 
her statement was false based on a generally accepted definition of sexual 
assault, rather than leading to an examination of whether a sexual assault 
was committed pursuant to the survivor-defendant’s perspective of the 
perpetrator’s actions. The cases of gender-based violence allegations dis-
cussed throughout this article indicate that the most reliable defense avail-
able in defamation cases brought against survivors is truth because any 
claims of abuse ultimately rely on statements of facts. Survivor-defend-
ants who raise an opinion defense in a gender-based violence lawsuit risk 
troubling implications that abusive behaviors are merely misinterpreted 
by the survivor and that the abuser’s actions did not fall outside of the 
scope of what was legally permissible. 
C. Privileges Affecting Defamation Claims 
Both absolute privilege, which absolves the defamer of all liability 
regardless of intent, and qualified privilege, which depends on whether 
the plaintiff can prove fault or malice, apply in defamation lawsuits at 
 
 90 See Dickinson v. Cosby, 17 Cal. App. 5th 655, 685-86 (Ct. App. 2017) (citing Milko-
vich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990)). 
 91 See Goldman v. Reddington, 417 F. Supp. 3d 163, 175-76 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). 
 92 See Green v. Cosby, 138 F. Supp. 3d 114, 133 (D. Mass. 2015) (applying California 
law); Giuffre v. Maxwell, 165 F. Supp. 3d 147, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (applying New York 
law). 
 93 Bailey Loosemore, supra note 16. 
 94 In Counter-Lawsuit, Woman Claims Haymarket Whiskey Bar Owner Spiked Her Drink, 
WDRB (Dec. 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/PG9V-KWUY. 
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common law.95 Both privileges have developed and evolved through time 
as a result of the common law policy that “the perceived social benefit in 
encouraging free speech or the discharge of governmental responsibility 
sometimes outweighs the individual’s underlying right to a good reputa-
tion.”96 In the context of defamation litigation against survivors, this sec-
tion focuses specifically on the absolute privilege of statements made in 
furtherance of litigation and judicial proceedings, and the qualified privi-
lege of common interest. 
Survivors who bring claims against an abuser in either civil or crim-
inal court may invoke the litigation or judicial proceeding privilege, an 
absolute privilege which has been developed to “encourage candor by 
parties involved in litigation.”97 Some jurisdictions permit a broad range 
of proceedings to qualify for a litigation privilege defense, applying the 
label of judicial proceedings to all formal legal proceedings and to all ver-
bal statements and written documents having “some relation” to the legal 
proceeding.98 This covers all statements that are related to litigation, in-
cluding out-of-court communications, as long as they are “pertinent to a 
good faith anticipated litigation.”99 California has broadly established that 
the communication must be in “furtherance of a judicial proceeding” as 
an “object of litigation.” A desire for vindication does not meet that stand-
ard.100 In addition, statements made prior to the commencement of antic-
ipated litigation or a judicial proceeding are privileged, but that privilege 
can be lost when a plaintiff-perpetrator can prove that the anticipated lit-
igation was not initiated in good faith—that is, where the threat to com-
mence litigation was merely a negotiating tactic and not a serious proposal 
in good faith contemplation of going to court.101 The privilege is also not 
voided by re-publications of the statement outside the judicial process, 
such as on the internet or in a newspaper.102 
The “common interest” qualified privilege is one of the more viable 
defenses for survivors of gender-based violence who face defamation 
 
 95 ELDER, supra note 75, § 2:1; SMOLLA, supra note 22, § 8:2 (“In a true absolute privilege 
situation, liability is totally foreclosed without regard to the fault or mental state of the de-
fendant.”). 
 96 Park Knoll Assocs. v. Schmidt, 59 N.Y.2d 205, 208 (1983); see ELDER, supra note 75, 
§ 2:1. 
 97 D’Annunzio v. Ayken, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 2d 211, 219 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 98 See ELDER, supra note 75, § 2:5 (referring to the jurisdictions of Ohio, Connecticut, 
Washington, D.C, California, Pennsylvania, and New York, among others). 
 99 LINDAHL, supra note 57, § 35:45; see Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979, 988 (9th 
Cir. 2002). 
 100 Rodriguez, 314 F.3d at 988. 
 101 See Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp., 53 Cal. App. 4th 15, 35 (Ct. App. 1997); 
LINDAHL, supra note 57, § 35:45. 
 102 LINDAHL, supra note 57, § 35:45. 
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claims. Several states have statutes that protect communications between 
interested persons, while others have developed the common interest priv-
ilege through common law.103 The Restatement establishes that a publi-
cation is conditionally privileged “if the circumstances lead any one of 
the several persons having a common interest in a particular subject mat-
ter correctly or reasonably to believe that there is information that another 
sharing the common interest is entitled to know.”104 This privilege carries 
some elasticity, as it covers friends or family within survivors’ support 
systems as well as in defined communities like education systems, busi-
nesses, or religious organizations.105  
Some anti-SLAPP defenses “protect any speech that is made in any 
forum in connection with any issue of public interest” or public concern, 
creating a broader scope of protection than the common interest privilege 
allows.106 Some courts consider statements about alleged “violence 
against women” a matter of public interest in an anti-SLAPP defense, ac-
knowledging that violence against women is a “widespread concern” re-
quiring public conversations to “shine a light” on the matter.107 Yet in 
order to satisfy this prong, the statements must “concern a person in the 
public eye or conduct that could directly affect large numbers of people 
beyond the participants of the [alleged] conversation” in which the state-
ments were made.108 Therefore, the availability of the anti-SLAPP de-
fense discussed later is a more appropriate defense for statements made 
publicly, while the common interest privilege may withstand allegations 
made to defined communities or support systems. 
In recognition of survivors’ emotional and physical needs, some 
courts have found that survivors’ allegations made in furtherance of their 
legitimate interest in personal safety for themselves or those close to them 
 
 103 See generally Defamation Basics State Laws Chart: Overview, supra note 32. 
 104 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 596 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
105 Id. 
 106 Alyssa R. Leader, A “SLAPP” in the Face of Free Speech: Protecting Survivors’ 
Rights to Speak Up in the “Me Too” Era, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 441, 454 (2019). Jurisdic-
tions in this category include California (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2020)), Con-
necticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-196a (West 2020)), Washington, D.C. (D.C. CODE 
ANN. § 16-5501 (West 2020)), Illinois (735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/15 (West 2020)), In-
diana (IND. CODE ANN. § 34-7-7-1 (West 2020)), Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5320 (West 
2020)), Louisiana (LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. ART. 971 (2019)), Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 14, § 556 (2019)), Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-807 (West 2020)), 
Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.150 (West 2020)), Rhode Island (9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
§ 9-33-2 (West 2019)), Texas (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.002 (West 2019)), 
and Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 12, § 1041 (West 2020)). Id. at n.98. 
 107 Bensussen v. Tadros, No. BC682869, 2018 WL 2390162, at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 
8, 2018); Saunders v. Jannusi, No. B292287, 2020 WL 1300880, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 
2020). 
 108 Jannusi, 2020 WL 1300880, at *4. 
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fall within the common interest privilege. This common interest privilege 
extends beyond the absolute privilege of abuse that may be alleged in 
criminal legal or medical systems because it covers members of survi-
vors’ support system when the allegations are not published to a “broad 
public forum such as the school newspaper or a social media network.”109 
The United Stated District Court for the District of Maryland has recog-
nized that there are times when a sexual assault victim will want to speak 
about abuse they have experienced to those in their lives and that requires 
protection for policy reasons: 
Victims would have to weigh, on the one hand, the value of reaching 
out for help in the aftermath of a traumatic sexual assault, and on the other 
hand the risk that they could be subject to civil liability for defamation if 
the occurrence of sexual assault is contested by the alleged perpetrator. 
Fortunately, Maryland courts do recognize a conditional privilege for 
such statements.110 
The common interest privilege has also been applied to allegations 
of abuse that occur in defined communities, such as church congregations, 
education systems, or medical facilities111—all communities that have 
faced sexual assault scandals. Specifically, courts have repeatedly found 
that alleged defamatory statements are of interest to other members of a 
church. For example, in Terry v. Davis Community Church, the subject 
matter that related to the church’s interests was a youth pastor’s inappro-
priate behavior with a member of his youth group.112 In that case, the Cal-
ifornia court decided that the board report given to church members re-
garding the youth pastor clearly involved the members’ shared interest 
because it “involved the societal interest in protecting a substantial num-
ber of children from predators.”113 Despite there being no criminal 
charges and no proof that a particular adult was a sexual predator, the 
defamation claim was dismissed because the sharing of information fur-
thered society’s interest in protecting minors from predators, particularly 
in a church program where community members expect their children to 
be safe.114 A Texas Court of Appeals has applied the same analysis to 
cases where adults were subjects of abuse, recognizing that church mem-
 
 109 Doe v. Salisbury Univ., 123 F. Supp. 3d 748, 759 (D. Md. 2015). 
 110 Id. at 759. 
 111 See Grenier v. Taylor, 234 Cal. App. 4th 471 (Ct. App. 2015); Terry v. Davis Cmty. 
Church, 131 Cal. App. 4th 1534 (Ct. App. 2005); Schwaiger v. Avera Queen of Peace Health 
Servs., 714 N.W.2d 874 (S.D. 2006); Campone v. Kline, No. 03-16-00854-CV, 2018 WL 
3652231 (Tex. App. 2018). 
 112 Terry, 131 Cal. App. 4th at 1538. 
 113 Id. at 1547. 
 114 Id. 
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bers have a common interest in knowing about their spiritual leaders’ in-
appropriate behavior towards women.115 The California and Texas deci-
sions indicate that community members’ safety can be prioritized over 
reputation. 
However, “a plaintiff can defeat a privilege claim at the motion to 
dismiss stage by plausibly alleging that the defendant acted with actual 
malice in making the statements at issue.”116 Again in the church context, 
one defendant proved that they did not have actual malice when sharing 
information about their church leader by demonstrating that they kept the 
allegations within the church community and genuinely trusted the infor-
mation that was shared with them.117 On the other hand, Harvey Wein-
stein’s motion to dismiss Ashley Judd’s defamation claim failed under the 
common interest privilege because Judd alleged that Weinstein acted with 
malice by “showing that the [statement] was motivated by hatred or ill 
will towards the plaintiff.”118 Judd argued that Weinstein made statements 
about her personality to Peter Jackson with the purpose of sabotaging her 
chances of being cast in the Lord of the Rings films because she rejected 
his sexual advances. 119 Judd then put forth evidence showing that Wein-
stein’s claims that his comments were made for the purpose of protecting 
the Lord of the Ring’s director’s hiring decisions could not be true, estab-
lishing a plausible inference that Weinstein was motivated by hatred or ill 
will.120 The two common interest defenses raised in the church context 
survived because there was no evidence that the defendants’ statements 
were untrue and because the defendants shared the information only with 
interested individuals.121 Therefore, where it is plausible or even likely 
that statements made by an alleged defamer were untrue, there is a greater 
chance that they may be found to have been made with malice and not for 
the purpose of common interest. 
The experience of Moira Donegan, the creator of the “Shitty Media 
Men” list, highlights the opportunities for alleged abusers to weaponize 
defamation claims against survivors and is an example of a scenario 
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where common interest may be a viable defense.122 Donegan anony-
mously distributed a spreadsheet to her peers in the publishing and media 
industry to identify and warn against those who had caused harm within 
their professional community.123 After her identity was exposed, she was 
immediately sued for defamation, with those named seeking out the iden-
tities of the contributors in order to challenge their claims.124 If exposed, 
the contributors will have to defend themselves against claims of false 
and defamatory intentional statements.125 Included in their consideration 
will be the defenses addressed here—truth and opinion—as well as the 
privileges, most notably the common interest privilege. The experiences 
of Moira Donegan and her peers demonstrate the extensive need for sur-
vivors of abuse to have viable legal strategies when defending themselves 
against defamation lawsuits. 
II. SIGNIFICANT DEFAMATION CASES ARISING FROM THE #METOO 
MOVEMENT 
 
As would be expected, when individuals are accused of sexual abuse 
or harassment, defamation lawsuits follow shortly thereafter.126 While 
victims have felt more empowered to speak up in the wake of #MeToo, 
those in positions of institutional power have used their resources to strike 
back  with legal consequences, like Brett Ratner, who immediately sued 
an alleged victim for defamation after she posted about how he subjected 
her to abuse online.127 This case eventually settled, as have others with 
similar circumstances, which suggests that high-profile or celebrity abus-
ers wield legal and financial power over victims that speak out about their 
abuse.128 For survivors, a settlement can often appear to be the best option, 
particularly when they cannot afford the emotional and financial costs of 
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civil litigation.129 Furthermore, they may fear the shame of being found 
liable for a defamation claim, which suggests dishonest character and tar-
nishes their reputation. For example, an alleged victim who spoke out 
about a sexual assault by Cristiano Ronaldo, an international soccer star, 
now faces not only a countersuit for defamation but also widespread pub-
lic shaming by him and his public relations team and attacks on her char-
acter—even after they had agreed to settle the case.130 However, the 
widely-publicized cases that do not settle shed some light on how victims 
can expect to evaluate a settlement offer or prepare their defenses in case 
they find themselves facing a defamation lawsuit. 
There are several lawsuits where survivors have successfully argued 
for a defamation claim’s dismissal, either through an anti-SLAPP defense 
or a common interest or qualified privilege, each respectively discussed 
below. SLAPPs are deterred in many states by anti-SLAPP laws, which 
protect an individual’s discourse when it involves a matter of public con-
cern.131 For instance, a California court granted a church leader-defend-
ant’s motion to strike after the defendants distributed a report to the 
church about the Minister of Youth-plaintiff’s inappropriate relationship 
with one youth group member.132 The court determined that protecting 
children is a matter of public interest133 and that the plaintiffs had failed 
to establish a probability of prevailing on the elements of a defamation 
claim under the anti-SLAPP defense, as the plaintiffs did not put forth 
evidence that the defendants’ statements or report contained a provably 
false assertion of facts.134 The court also found for the defendants based 
on the common interest privilege defense, because the information was 
distributed to a select group of people who had an interest in protecting 
their children from potential offenders.135 
Additionally, when singer-songwriter Margaret Osborn’s (aka Alice 
Glass) former boyfriend, Ethan Kath, claimed her allegations of sexual, 
physical, and emotional abuse were defamatory, the California Supreme 
Court dismissed Kath’s defamation claim through an anti-SLAPP coun-
tersuit.136 The defendant established that her speech was protected, the 
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first prong of the anti-SLAPP defense, because the statements were made 
in a public forum, the internet, and the allegations involved a topic of 
widespread public interest: entertainers who allegedly committed sexual 
misconduct.137 Next, the court held that Kath’s claims of his and Osborn’s 
loving relationship via statements from Osborn’s emails and diaries were 
not sufficient evidence to dispute the allegations of abuse, because they 
were conclusory and procedurally defective and thus did not demonstrate 
the probability that Kath would prevail on the merits of his claim.138 
A Texas court similarly relied on state anti-SLAPP legislation, the 
Texas Citizens Participation Act (“TCPA”), to dismiss a defamation 
claim against several parishioners of the Sai Temple of Spiritual Healing 
who had shared information that the founder of the temple behaved inap-
propriately toward three women.139 The defendants put forth an anti-
SLAPP defense and a Texas common law defense of qualified privilege, 
which protects statements made without actual malice.140 The court deter-
mined that the TCPA applied because allegations that the plaintiff made 
multiple women feel uncomfortable “touch[ed] on issues of . . . public 
safety (whether he made women feel unsafe),” satisfying the anti-SLAPP 
“matters of public concern” element.141 The court found that the state-
ments were also protected by qualified privilege because “the people to 
whom [the Defendants] spoke, a third person, or one of their family mem-
bers had an interest that was sufficiently affected by the statement,” and 
the statements were made without actual malice, established by their ac-
tual reliance and trust in the people who shared the information with 
them.142 Cases in California and Texas thus show that anti-SLAPP and 
common interest privileges are two possible responses to defamation 
claims that can successfully result in case dismissals. 
Additionally, several high-profile cases where defendants have 
raised anti-SLAPP defenses are currently pending resolution, leaving le-
gal experts speculating on what the outcomes of these cases will mean for 
defamation law. Most notable is celebrity-singer Kesha’s anti-SLAPP de-
fense, which she raised after being sued for defamation for accusing her 
former manager of sexual assault and which remains unsettled.143 Another 
pending case involves Kentucky bar owner Matthew Landan, who has 
sued an unnamed woman for defamation after she posted a picture of him 
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online with the caption, “MATTHEW LANDAN IS A RAPIST.”144 In 
response, the survivor-defendant has both moved for dismissal, arguing 
truth as a defense, and countersued, claiming that the plaintiff filed a law-
suit with improper intentions.145 These ongoing cases raise questions 
about First Amendment rights as well as the standard of maliciousness 
required when the plaintiff is a public figure. 
Defamation claims by survivors against their alleged abusers are also 
continuing to emerge as part of the #MeToo movement. Notably, famous 
Hollywood actor Bill Cosby has been sued for defamation by several vic-
tims who claim he sexually assaulted them.146 One such alleged victim, 
Katherine McKee, reported in a publicized interview with the New York 
Daily News that Cosby had raped her 40 years ago.147 Cosby’s attorney 
then wrote a letter to the Daily News on Cosby’s behalf, and McKee al-
leges he leaked this letter to the media, which reported on its contents 
widely.148 McKee then sued Cosby for defamation, asserting 24 defama-
tion counts based on various parts of the letter.149 The First Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the defamation claim, 
and McKee’s petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the Supreme 
Court.150 Seven other women sued Bill Cosby for defamation when his 
representatives accused them of lying about the abuse and have since set-
tled their claims.151 However, Cosby will not be financially contributing 
to the settlement, because the insurance company involved decided to set-
tle for him and will be paying the claims.152 Cosby maintains his inno-
cence, denies the plaintiffs’ allegations, and is pursuing a countersuit 
against each of them for tarnishing his reputation.153 The judge has not 
yet approved the insurance settlement, and the countersuits are pend-
ing.154 
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Alternatively, President Trump has raised constitutional defenses in 
response to defamation lawsuits arising from statements he made about 
women who accused him of sexual harassment. The Appellate Division 
of New York’s Supreme Court in the First Department has rejected Pres-
ident Trump’s argument that he is not subject to suit in a state court as a 
sitting president and, more importantly, has ruled that the defamation 
cause of action brought against him satisfies the minimal standard neces-
sary to proceed.155 This ongoing New York case provides an opportunity 
for legal scholars to analyze any potential decisions or settlements that 
may result. Harvey Weinstein is another public figure who faces a defa-
mation lawsuit stemming from the #MeToo era.156 Actress Ashley Judd 
initiated a lawsuit when she learned later in her career that director Peter 
Jackson had not hired her for The Lord of the Rings movie because Wein-
stein told him that Judd was “a nightmare” to work with. Judd alleged that 
Weinstein made this statement to retaliate against her for rejecting his 
sexual advances, unbeknownst to Jackson.157 Judd alleged that Wein-
stein’s statements caused her harm by damaging her career opportunities, 
and her defamation claim remains pending in the U.S. District Court for 
the Central District of California.158 
It is too soon to ascertain any definite trends across the landscape of 
current and ongoing defamation cases. However, these cases provide 
some information that attorneys and survivors can use when conducting 
a cost-benefit analysis as to whether and how their claims of abuse should 
be made, anonymous or otherwise. They also provide examples of de-
fenses to consider if there are concerns about a pending or potential defa-
mation lawsuit against a survivor. Furthermore, these cases not only offer 
the possibility of additional precedent to follow, but may also shape pub-
lic opinion in a way that impacts survivors’ strategic choices. 
III. ANTI-SLAPP AS A DEFENSE FOR SURVIVORS ALLEGING ABUSE 
Anti-SLAPP statutes provide a defense strategy against defamation 
claims.159 These statutes deter lawsuits that interfere with the constitu-
tional rights of freedom of speech and which are meant to harass those 
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who have exercised that right,160 and where the plaintiff’s purpose of their 
lawsuit is solely to deplete the defendant’s energy and drain their re-
sources.161 Approximately 21 states have some form of anti-SLAPP stat-
utes, and they vary in scope and effectiveness, with some states focusing 
primarily on acts of retaliation against individuals who have attempted to 
participate in the governmental process or procure some other type of 
government action.162 Other states, like California, have broadened the 
reach of their anti-SLAPP statute to cover any exercise of free speech 
rights on matters of public concern.163 One attorney arguing a California 
case in which a court ruled that the state’s anti-SLAPP legislation pro-
tected the defendant’s comments about her alleged harasser said that mak-
ing claims of abuse is a “free speech issue” and a “public policy con-
cern.”164 She argued that survivors should feel safe making statements 
about the abuse they experienced without liability so that the abuse can 
be addressed through proper channels.165 
A. The Mechanics of an Anti-SLAPP Defense 
Where broad anti-SLAPP statutes are available, they provide an ad-
ditional procedural vehicle with which to strike down a defamation 
claim.166 They allow defendants to bring a special motion to dismiss or 
strike a frivolous lawsuit or claim where the only goal of the lawsuit is to 
silence the defendant.167 The anti-SLAPP defense provides a remedy 
through a summary judgment-like procedure that stays all discovery, 
weeding out meritless claims by ending litigation before the initiation of 
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invasive discovery procedures or a trial that raises the risk of re-trauma-
tizing the victim.168 The ability to stop a defamation case as early as pos-
sible is significant because survivors face more than just the risk of a fi-
nancial loss from a settlement or a judgment: along the way, they must 
pay attorney’s fees, experience wasted time and lost wages, and relive 
painful memories, often in detail. 
The resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion in a defamation lawsuit in-
volves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that their allegedly 
defamatory statement(s) arose from a protected activity.169 “The anti-
SLAPP statute’s definitional focus is not on the form of the plaintiff’s 
cause of action but, rather, the defendant’s activity that gives rise to their 
asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech 
or petitioning.”170 This requirement is meant to protect the defendant’s 
right of free speech when it is connected to a public issue.171 Importantly, 
some state statutes cast a wide net with regards to public safety, permit-
ting statements made in any official proceedings authorized by law, even 
if made outside of the courtroom with no function of the court or its of-
ficers involved,172 while others specifically permit issues of health and 
safety.173 
Second, if the defendant makes the required showing that their activ-
ity is protected, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merits 
of their claim by establishing sufficient evidence of each element of the 
claim in question.174 This is an additional barrier for the plaintiff, as they 
are then responsible for establishing that their case is likely to succeed on 
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the merits with minimal evidence, since anti-SLAPP statutes provide for 
a stay or a highly truncated version of discovery.175 An anti-SLAPP de-
fense can thus “hamstring a plaintiff’s case,” particularly when the plain-
tiff is a public figure, as public figures must prove actual malice, which is 
incredibly difficult to establish without discovery.176 Facially, the plaintiff 
must put forth more than a mere claim that what the defendant alleges is 
false: there must be some specific denial of the truth of the victim’s state-
ments. A plaintiff has to demonstrate that their claim is both legally and 
factually sufficient to sustain a favorable judgement.177 However, the 
plaintiff “need only establish that his or her claim has minimal merit to 
avoid being stricken as a SLAPP.”178 The court will grant the anti-SLAPP 
motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant’s evidence supporting the mo-
tion defeats the plaintiff’s attempt to establish support for the claim, with-
out weighing the credibility or comparing probative strength of this evi-
dence.179 
The benefit of an anti-SLAPP defense is that, as long the survivor 
can argue their statements were a matter of public interest, the burden is 
on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case for defamation, requiring 
more than a mere allegation of a false statement.180 Where defendants 
have access to anti-SLAPP statutes, they may be used as a first line of 
defense.181 
B. Anti-SLAPP Outcomes 
Recent widely publicized cases may provide useful guidance to those 
who are considering alleging abuse or harassment outside of the litigation 
context and to prepare for potential defamation claims. Anti-SLAPP de-
fenses are one such remedy, as courts have been acknowledging on a more 
frequent basis that allegations of intimate partner violence, sexual assault, 
and harassment should be recognized as protected speech as matters of 
public interest within the context of anti-SLAPP litigation.182 Further-
more, an anti-SLAPP defense requires plaintiffs to establish that their al-
legations are likely to succeed on the merits, requiring specificity about 
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the plaintiff’s version of events at an early stage of litigation.183 As many 
ongoing cases continue, their outcomes will begin to reveal new glosses 
on longstanding defamation elements in a culture where sexual harass-
ment and abuse claims are rising.184 
The following analysis discusses the outcomes of defamation claims 
filed against survivors of abuse to illustrate the risks of defamation claims 
arising from the #MeToo movement and whether there are any additional 
protections available to survivors resulting from evolving case law.  
 In California, DJ and producer William Bensussen sued two 
women who alleged he had drugged and raped them.185 Both women re-
sponded with motions to strike and an anti-SLAPP defense.186 While the 
defamation case survived a motion to strike, the California court found 
that “violence against women” satisfies the public interest prong of an 
anti-SLAPP defense, further establishing this defense as an option for 
California survivors.187 The court noted that “violence against women is 
of pressing public concern” and that the “boundaries of a public issue” 
involve statements that concern a person or entity in the public eye, con-
duct that could directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct 
participants, or a topic of widespread public interest.188 Allegations of 
sexual assault and violence against women satisfy these guiding princi-
ples for the anti-SLAPP defense’s public interest test: they are an issue 
that involves more than mere curiosity and a matter of concern to a sub-
stantial number of people—there is some degree of closeness between the 
challenged statements and the asserted public interest, and the focus of 
the speaker’s conduct is the public interest and “not a mere effort for more 
ammunition for another round of private controversy.”189 This expands 
the possibilities for defamation defenses and establishes that intimate 
partner violence, sexual assault, and harassment should, as a bright-line 
rule, be considered matters of public interest. Therefore, when a survivor 
is establishing an anti-SLAPP defense, their case should not require much 
more than indicating the existence of some form of violence against 
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women, which would then shift the burden to the plaintiff to establish 
their prima facie case. 
This is exactly what happened in Bensussen: after the court decided 
that the defendants made a threshold showing that the challenged cause 
of action arose from a protected activity, the burden then shifted to 
Bensussen in the second stage of the anti-SLAPP defense, which required 
him to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of the case. The 
court concluded that the survivor-defendants’ claim about being drugged 
and raped by the plaintiff was a provably false assertion of fact that was 
sufficiently challenged by the plaintiff’s evidence and permitted the case 
to proceed to the next stage.190 The plaintiff submitted evidence of wit-
nesses who were present when he bought drinks for the defendants.191 The 
witnesses stated they did not observe or hear anything that indicated the 
plaintiff put drugs in their drinks, nor did they witness the women behav-
ing in a manner which indicated they had been drugged or were not con-
senting to sexual intercourse.192 Ultimately, the court determined that 
proof of actual malice was not yet needed at the anti-SLAPP stage and 
that the plaintiff had established merit for his claim.193 The plaintiff has 
since dropped his lawsuit against one defendant after they both issued 
public statements in which Tadros acknowledged that, although she was 
sexually assaulted, she did not know who sexually assaulted her.194 
However, in some jurisdictions, imprecise rebuttals to defendants’ 
allegations typically do not satisfy the anti-SLAPP standard of “likely to 
succeed on the merits.” Specifically, the Texas anti-SLAPP legislation 
requires that in a defamation case there must be “pleadings and evidence 
that establishes the facts of when, where, and what was said, the defama-
tory nature of the statements, and how they damaged the plaintiff” to re-
sist a TCPA motion to dismiss.195 Clear and specific evidence, as required 
under the TCPA, must be “unambiguous, sure, or free from doubt” and 
“explicit or relating a particular named thing.”196 Consequently, a Texas 
Court of Appeals has found that a plaintiff-politician’s pleadings did not 
include sufficient evidence when they merely stated that the defendant 
had made “false and defamatory claims that [the plaintiff] committed sex-
ual assault” and that the defendant’s “statements were false because [the 
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plaintiff] never engaged in such behavior.”197 The court explicitly stated 
that the pleadings contained “no evidence . . . that [the survivor’s] press 
release statement was both false and made with knowledge of, or reckless 
disregard for, its falsity,” satisfying neither the falsity standard nor the 
much higher actual malice standard required for public figures.198 
And, as discussed above, when former boyfriend and bandmate 
Ethan Kath sued Margaret Osborn for her allegations that he had sexually, 
physically, and emotionally abused her, the reviewing California court 
dismissed Kath’s defamation claim through an anti-SLAPP countersuit, 
finding that Kath’s evidence was inadmissible because it was conclusory 
and entirely procedurally defective.199 California courts preclude plain-
tiffs’ declarations show a probability of prevailing on the merits when 
they are made without “foundation or personal knowledge, or . . . are ar-
gumentative, speculative, impermissible opinion, hearsay, or conclu-
sory,”200 which precisely describes Kath’s pleadings. However, while 
Kath’s unauthorized declarations and evidence of Osborn’s affections 
were insufficient to show a probability of prevailing on the merits of the 
claim, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Cali-
fornia has held in other circumstances that a declaration expressly contra-
dicting facts put forth by the defendant does have minimal merit.201 Even 
where the declaration is self-serving, “the Court does not weigh the evi-
dence or assess the credibility of Plaintiff’s declaration and merely deter-
mines whether there is sufficient evidence for a jury to decide in Plain-
tiff’s favor.”202 Consequently, the court denied a defendant-victim’s 
motion to strike when the plaintiff denied his ex-girlfriend’s claims that 
he abused and sexually assaulted her because “evidence to prove personal 
knowledge may consist of the witness’s own testimony.”203 This line of 
cases demonstrates that jurisdictions differ in their approach to evaluating 
evidence put forth to show a probability of prevailing on the merits for 
the element of falsity, which should be considered when determining if 
an anti-SLAPP defense is appropriate. 
 
 197 Vander-Plas v. May, No. 07-15-00454-CV, 2016 WL 5851913, at *2 (Tex. App. 2016). 
 198 Id. at *6. 
 199 See Palmieri v. Osborn, No. BC681889, 2018 Cal. Super. LEXIS 3068, at *9-10 (Su-
per. Ct. Feb. 23, 2018). 
 200 Id. at *10. 
 201 Id.; Guzman v. Finch, No. 19CV412-MMA (MDD), 2019 WL 1877184, at *8 (S.D. 
Cal. Apr. 26, 2019). 
 202 Guzman, 2019 WL 1877184, at *8. 
 203 Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 602). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Note gathers strategies that can support survivors when they 
choose to speak out about their abuse, as well as further information about 
how survivors can tell their stories with the least litigious consequences. 
The cases discussed above illustrate various courts’ decision-making pro-
cesses and how the nature of these cases shapes or changes their rulings 
on defamation claims. Jurisdictions that offer broad anti-SLAPP defenses 
provide a possible additional layer of defense for survivors who seek to 
conclude a defamation case as quickly as possible. Furthermore, current 
high-profile cases continue to evolve the defamation defense case law. 
For example, pop star Kesha’s anti-SLAPP defense case has yet to be re-
solved.204 This leaves open the possibility of an anti-SLAPP judgment or 
a trial, which could provide monumental insight into applicability of an 
anti-SLAPP defense or a judgment on the merits of a defamation case. 
The #MeToo movement alone will not provide complete freedom for sur-
vivors to speak out about their abuse, but any reduction of the risk and 
negative impact of defamation claims will provide greater space for sur-
vivors to speak their truth. 
 
 
 204 See Gottwald v. Sebert, 172 A.D.3d 445 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019). 
